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ABSTRACT
Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) mechanisms have been attracting a lot of
interest from the research community in recent times. This is especially because of
the flexibility and extensibility it provides by using attributes assigned to subjects as
the basis for access control. ABAC enables an administrator of a server to enforce
access policies on the data, services and other such resources fairly easily. It also
accommodates new policies and changes to existing policies gracefully, thereby making
it a potentially good mechanism for implementing access control in large systems,
particularly in today’s age of Cloud Computing.
However management of the attributes in ABAC environment is an area that has
been little touched upon. Having a mechanism to allow multiple ABAC based systems
to share data and resources can go a long way in making ABAC scalable. At the same
time each system should be able to specify their own attribute sets independently .
In the research presented in this document a new mechanism is proposed that
would enable users to share resources and data in a cloud environment using ABAC
techniques in a distributed manner. The focus is mainly on decentralizing the access
policy specifications for the shared data so that each data owner can specify the
access policy independent of others. The concept of ontologies and semantic web is
introduced in the ABAC paradigm that would help in giving a scalable structure to the
attributes and also allow systems having different sets of attributes to communicate
and share resources.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Attribute Based Access Control
Attribute Based Access Control is a form of logical access control that includes
access control lists, role-based access control and the ABAC method for providing
access based on the evaluation of attributes [1]. Traditional access control mecha-
nisms used an Access Control List (ACL) that would determine which user has what
permissions on a particular resource. This Identity Based Access Control (IBAC)
required the subject to present a credential that matches with the one held in the
ACL in order to be given access to the requested object. Individual privileges of the
subject to perform operations were managed on an individual basis by the object
owner. Each object or resource needed its own ACL and a set of privileges assigned
to each subject. The authorization decisions were made prior to any specific access
request. This approach was fairly straightforward when the number of users and re-
sources was less. But in today’s age of large scale servers and clouds that span servers
located in different geographical locations, this approach would be difficult to scale.
For example, in a system having a million users, sharing a new resource would mean
specifying which of these million users should get access to this resource. Therefore
this approach was deemed cumbersome to manage and scale up based on the needs
of the system.
The inherent problems in IBAC gave rise to another access control mechanism
called Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [2] [3]. RBAC categorized users as sat-
isfying particular roles defined by the system and multiple users could be grouped
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together based on the role which they have been assigned by the system. These roles
are pre defined and carry a specific set of privileges associated with them. Users
assigned to a role derive their privileges from it and access permissions are assigned
to roles rather than individual users. The object or resource owner determines the
roles that are given specific access privileges while sharing the resource and associates
these permissions with each role. The major difference from IBAC is that now the
role is considered to be a subject rather than an individual user where access control is
concerned. At the point of an access request, the access control mechanism evaluates
the role assigned to the subject that is requesting access and the set of operations this
role is authorized to perform on the object before rendering and enforcing an access
decision. RBAC made the management of access policies much easier and reduced
the need to have an ACL associated with each resource.
Though RBAC solved many of the problems inherent in IBAC, it was still con-
sidered to be somewhat restrictive since the access decision was based on the role of
the user and it was difficult to fit other factors in calculating the decision. As per
[1] ”both ACLs and RBAC are in some ways special cases of ABAC in terms of the
attributes used. ACLs work on the attribute of ’identity’ and RBAC works on the
attribute of ’role’.” ABAC is considered to be a more generic way of defining access
policies and conditions since it can accommodate a broader set of factors in defining
the policies than the other mechanisms of access control. An access policy in ABAC
can express a complex boolean rule set that can evaluate a variety of attributes in a
much easier manner as compared to IBAC or RBAC. It is also easier to update access
rules in ABAC since it is much more difficult to identify all the places where the ACL
or RBAC implementation needs to be updated [1].
ABAC is advantageous especially in a large enterprise environment where main-
taining an access list for users or a list of roles for the users can be a very tedious task.
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Today’s large scale computation environments need to accommodate a large number
of users (potentially infinite) and continuous changes in the operating conditions. An
access control mechanism for such an environment needs to be highly flexible in order
to gracefully manage the large user base as well as gracefully manage the frequent
changes without affecting the performance of the system and introducing unwanted
delays. ABAC avoids the need for explicit authorizations to be directly assigned to
individual subjects prior to a request to perform an operation on an object. It is the
natural convergence of existing access control models and surpasses their functional-
ity [4]. Moreover, it enables flexibility by leveraging consistently defined attributes
that span both subjects and objects. It allows for other activities like authentication
and authorization in the same or different infrastructures while maintaining a proper
level of security.
1.2 Ontologies and Semantic Web
The concept of ontologies was introduced in Computer Science because of the need
for knowledge representation in artificial intelligence and other fields of informatics.
If we consider two articles that describe the same concept, the words and language
used to describe in both articles will be different and therefore it is difficult to apply
machine learning techniques to analyse the data. Thus representing the meaning of
concepts rather that just giving computer instructions is increasingly important. This
is where the concept of ontologies comes into picture.
Gruber [5] defined ontologies as an ”explicit specification of conceptualization”.
He considers conceptualization to be ”an abstract, simplified view of the world that
we wish to represent for some purpose”. Ontologies are a way to share knowledge
between different components of a system like two programs that work on similar data.
They are a form of agreement or contract between all the components regarding the
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”meaning” of the concepts and data that they work with. If we consider a system that
describes various sports for example, one component can describe ”Table-tennis” and
another component can call it ”Ping-pong”. An ontology can define an agreement
that say that both ”Table-tennis” and ”Ping-pong” in fact refer to the same sport.
Such an agreement can allow different component to use different terms to define the
same concept, which in this case is the sport referred to by ”Table-tennis” and ”Ping-
pong”. Such a system allows distributed and independent development of system
components as long as they abide by the ”agreement” that is defined by the system.
This can be considered similar to the use of interfaces in the Java programming
language where different classes can be used for the same task (done in different ways
by each class) as long as they implement the defined interface.
An important concept in the world of semantic web is the Resource Description
Framework (RDF) [6]. It is a standard created by the Worldwide Web Consortium
(W3C) with a goal to ”enable and promote encoding, exchange and reuse of structured
metadata”. It is expressed using the eXtensible Markup Language (XML) with added
constraints. The Web Ontology Language (OWL) [7] adds semantic meaning to
the data expressed in RDF and is ideal for creating ontologies. According to the
W3C specification for OWL [7] ”OWL’s ability to express ontological information
about individuals appearing in multiple documents supports linking of data from
diverse sources in a principled way.” This allows the ontology specification to be
performed in a distributed manner and express equivalences and hierarchies that
can state the relation(s) between individuals or properties that have been defined by
different attribute authorities. The information about the different attributes can
be merged and this aggregation can be used to determine facts that are not directly
represented in any one source [7].
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1.3 Attribute Based Encryption
Attribute based encryption was first proposed in 2005 by Sahai and Waters as
a cryptographic scheme to provide anonymous access control [8]. Each ciphertext is
associated with a policy that determines which user or class of users can access or
decrypt the encrypted data. It is a modified version of the traditional public key
encryption scheme and ABE provides multiple private keys corresponding to a public
key. Each private key has associated with it a set of attributes and their corresponding
values that define the access permissions of the user to whom the key has been issued.
When the user attempts to decrypt the ciphertext using his/her private key, the ABE
algorithm checks whether the user’s attributes (which are associated with the private
key) match the encryption policy of the ciphertext. Only if the algorithm finds a
match, the text or data is decrypted successfully.
Basically ABE comes in two flavours namely ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE)
and key-policy ABE (KP-ABE). Both these are explained later in the document in the
detailed section on ABE. Though ABE is still not in widespread use due to slower per-
formance as compared to traditional symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes,
it still has a big potential to enforce coarse as well fine grained access control policies
with the same ease. The main advantage of using ABE is that key management is
more simple from the user perspective. If we consider a scenario that a user wants to
share a file with n other users. In the traditional public key cryptography scenario,
the user would need to know the public keys of each of the n users, encrypt the file
with each of these n public keys and then send the encrypted files to their intended
recipients. Contrastingly, using ABE, the user simply needs to encrypt it once using
the public key and then specify the access control policy that would define this set of
n users.
6
The policy is generally a boolean expression over a set of attributes. If we consider
the system to be that of a university and we need to share some data only with say,
the faculty of Computer Science department. A sample policy that would define this
set would be
(Faculty ∧ CS dept)
ABE can support much more complex attribute policies where specific values or
range of values can be specified by the user for the attributes using boolean relation
operators. This support makes it very easy for the resource owner to specify the
target set of users based on their attributes and does not need to know details that are
specific to an individual user. Addition of new users is also fairly straightforward since
the new user only needs to be provided with required attributes without changing the
ciphertext access policy. This allows the resource owner to encrypt the resource just
once (unless of course, the access policy needs to be changed).
Since the main feature of ABE is the use of attributes for specifying access per-
missions and rules, it requires a trusted authority to decide the attributes to be used
in the system and also to issue private keys to the users. This Attribute Authority
(AA) possesses a secret master key that is used to generate the private keys to be
issued to the users. ABE provides a setup function to generate a master key and
a corresponding public key that would be used by the authority in generating the
private keys. These private keys are issued to the users when they register with the
system and the keys ensure that the users get access to only those resources for which
they are authorized. The security and reliability of ABE is dependent on the trust-
worthiness of the AA. If the AA is compromised or if the master key is stolen then it
is easy to break the security protocol.
There have been previous attempts to integrate ABE with access control mecha-
nisms like [9], [10] and [11]. The research presented in this document also tries to use
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ABE, particularly CP-ABE to provide additional security over the ABAC mechanism
that is introduced.
1.4 How does it come together?
Now that three fairly different and independent topics have been introduced, a
fundamental question comes to mind that how can we use them together to design
a robust system that is secure and at the same time easy to use. It is easy to
understand how we can merge ABAC and ABE techniques since both are somewhat
related due the use of attributes to define access policies. ABE techniques can be
used to provide an additional layer of security to the data and resource that users
share with each other in a cloud, for example so that even if a user manages to forge
the access credentials of another user at the ABAC layer, he would get the resource
in an encrypted format. Until and unless the user has access to the forged user’s
private key, he won’t be able to decrypt the resource. Since private keys are generally
secured outside the system with possibly physical security too, we can consider ABE
to be secure in this scenario.
Now that it is somewhat established that ABAC and ABE would possibly work
together, the next problem that arises is how does a user specify an access policy.
The first technique that comes to mind is let the server or administrator do the
work of generating the policy thereby providing a centralized way of ensuring coher-
ence between multiple access policies. The server can then do the job of encrypting
the resource before sharing it with the intended set of users. This works for most
cases, however ABE, in its current state is computationally more intensive than other
established symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic techniques. In a cloud, with
possibly millions of users this design could possibly overload the server’s computa-
tional resources thereby impacting performance negatively. This is where I introduce
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the use of ontologies to de-centralize the entire process to a large extent and reduce
the load on the server while ensuring coherence of attributes.
1.5 Research Outline
In the following sections I describe in more detail the architecture and processes
of my proposed design.
I first give a comprehensive overview of the Attribute Based Access Control model
in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 will concentrate on Ontologies and semantic web and discuss how giving
a semantic structure to data helps improve the performance and complexity of our
systems.
Chapter 4 will briefly cover the concept of Attribute Based Encryption with special
focus on its potential as a possible encryption mechanism in real world situations.
Chapter 5 will bring it all together and we will see how Ontologies can be used for
management of user attributes in a distributed ABAC environment along with using
ABE for cryptographic purposes.
Finally in Chapter 6 I will discuss the current open problems and suggestions for
future work in this area.
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Chapter 2
ATTRIBUTE BASED ACCESS CONTROL
As per the ABAC document released by NIST in 2014 [1], ”The concept of ABAC
represents a point in the space of logical access control that includes access control
lists, role-based access control, and the ABAC method for providing access based
on the evaluation of attributes.” ABAC expands the concept of Role-based Access
Control (RBAC) to allow for a broader set of attributes to be used in addition to the
”role” that a user is allotted in the system. In a sense, we can think of RBAC as a
subset of ABAC.
The following is a high-level definition of ABAC [1]
ABAC is an access control method where subject requests to perform operations
of objects are granted or denied based on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned
attributes of the object, environment conditions, and a set of policies that are specified
in terms of those attributes and conditions
Attributes are characteristics of the subject, object, or environment conditions.
Attributes contain information given by a name-value pair.
A subject is a human user or NPE, such as a device that issues access requests
to perform operations on objects. Subjects are assigned one or more attributes and
are synonymous with users.
An object is a system resource for which access is managed by the ABAC system.
It can be the resource or requested entity, as well as anything upon which an operation
may be performed by a subject including data, applications, services, devices, and
networks.
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Figure 2.1: Basic ABAC Scenario [1]
An operation is the execution of a function at the request of a subject upon an
object. Operations include read, write, edit, delete, copy, execute, and modify.
Policy is the representation of rules or relationships that makes it possible to
determine if a requested access should be allowed, given the values of the attributes
of the subject, object, and possibly environment conditions.
Environment conditions are operational or situational context in which access
requests occur and these are independent of the subject or object.
An ABAC system assigns attributes to individual users that help in defining the
access permissions to the users. Whenever a user requests access to a particular
resource, the system will check if the user’s attributes satisfy the access policy defined
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for that resource. Only if the user attributes satisfy the policy is the access provided
to the user. Every time a new user (or subject) is created, it needs to be assigned its
set of attributes. A change in the access permission level for a subject would basically
mean a change in the attributes for that subject. The establishment of a user as a
subject and specification of the attributes is done by a trusted administrator. These
attributes are meant to capture the user and system level characteristics of that user.
An attribute authority within the system maintains the subject identity information
for the resource management system. The subject attributes may need to be updated
every time new users are added or old users are removed. As new subjects join the
organizations, rules and objects do not need to be modified. As long as the subject is
assigned the attributes necessary for access to the required objects, no modifications to
existing rules or object attributes are required. This is especially advantageous when
we use ABE for encrypting the resources using attribute policies, as the object need
not be encrypted again (encryption is considered to be a computationally intensive
operation).
Every resource or object in the system that is intended to be shared securely
among the different subjects, needs to have an access policy defined for it. This
access policy is usually a boolean expression over the set of attributes defined by the
system for the subjects, operations and environment conditions. As per [1] , ”this
policy is normally derived from documented or procedural rules that describe the
business processes and allowable actions within the organization”. A good example
would be the case of healthcare systems where only a limited number of authorized
users are allowed to access a patients medical records. The more sensitive the data,
the more strict the access policy is.
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2.1 Performance Requirements of ABAC
ABAC is mainly intended to simplify access control in enterprise environment
where different organizations of the same enterprise manage resources in a distributed
manner and one organization can have access to authorized resources managed by an-
other organization. This interaction can be quite complex since the components are
usually distributed across networks and geographical locations. The larger and more
diverse the enterprise, the more complex the interactions get. One request to access
a resource can lead to requests for attribute evaluation, policy checking, validation of
request, integrity of resource, etc and thus the benefit of implementing ABAC mech-
anisms need to be carefully evaluated before the decision is taken. The scalability
of the ABAC system is one of the most important aspects that needs to be consid-
ered. In an enterprise environment, it should be easy to add more organisations and
remove existing organizations without disturbing the existing set up. In the context
of ABAC, the attribute management is an area to be considered since the allowed
sets of attributes can change over time especially when organizational restructuring
occurs. When implementing ABAC over an existing system, the distribution of the
ABAC components needs to take into account the existing underlying architecture
and accordingly determine an efficient manner to store and share the data with min-
imum modification to the existing system. While designing an ABAC system for an
enterprise, one needs to consider the amount of coupling that has to occur with the
existing software architecture. A loosely coupled system would be more beneficial for
maintainence as the ABAC mechanism can be maintained independently of the other
components thereby reducing the maintenance costs involved. In the context of ex-
tensibility, the ABAC architecture needs to be flexible enough to allow for additional
security mechanisms to be added to it or above it. It allows the customization of the
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mechanism as per the enterprise requirements and does not restrict the architecture
to one particular implementation.
So What’s the Problem?
In the current era of large scale enterprise systems and cloud computing, ABAC
can be a strong mechanism to implement access control. So far we have discussed the
design of an ABAC system with a single attribute authority that takes care of the
attribute assignment to the subjects and the specification of access policies on the
objects. In a large scale system, the question of scalability comes up. So can we scale
ABAC with its current structure of a single attribute authority? This is the main
issue that I aim to resolve in my research work and this is where I intend to introduce
the concept of Ontologies (described in Chapter 2) into the ABAC system design.
In the scalable ABAC design, we have multiple ”systems” that interact with each
other and share data and resources. Each individual system has its own attribute
authority that is responsible for the attribute management within its own domain.
Each attribute authority independently defines its own set of attributes to be used by
the users within its domain and these can be similar or different from those defined
by other attribute authorities. Now when these multiple system need to share data
and resources, we need to define access policies that would be valid for the users of
all the different systems. The main problem in this scenario is how do we negotiate
the attributes between two different systems so that the access policy of one system
can be used by the other system as well.
When the different systems decide to share their resources, an initial negotiation of
attributes needs to take place. A common Ontology is established, that would be used
by all the systems to define their access policies. The advantage of using an ontology
would be that it can define equivalence and hierarchy among different attributes. For
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example, the ontology can say that an attribute attr1 from system S1 is equivalent
to attribute attr2 from system S2. Therefore, if an object from S2 is shared with
access policy attr2, a user in S1 having attribute attr1 would be able to access it. A
more concrete example would be in an academic environment where a project is being
done in collaboration between two institutions. One institution specifies that certain
data is to be accessed only by users having Faculty attribute. However the second
institution does not have Faculty as a part of its attribute set. Therefore without an
ontology, a user from the second institution will not be able to access that particular
data. Now if we define a common ontology that says that the attribute Faculty is
equivalent to the attribute Teacher (which is a part of the attribute set of the second
institution), the concerned attribute authority can translate the access policy in a
form suitable for the user of the second institution and thus any user having the
attribute Teacher will also be able to access the data meant for users with attribute
Faculty.
So far, this looks to be a good possible solution to allow for a distributed approach
to specifying access policies in an ABAC environment. How exactly we can define
equivalent attributes will be described in the next chapter where Ontologies will be
described in detail.
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Chapter 3
ONTOLOGIES AND SEMANTIC WEB
In this chapter I will give an overview of the concept of Ontologies and the Se-
mantic web and focus more on how it can be used to allow for flexible management
of attributes in a distributed ABAC environment.
Ontologies are a formal representation of knowledge in the form of sets of concepts
in a domain and denotes the types, properties and relationships between the concepts.
These have been extensively used to organize information in various fields like artificial
intelligence, biomedical informatics, library science, etc. They are a way to share
knowledge between different components of a system, such as two programs that
work on similar data. They form an agreement or contract between the components
regarding the ”meaning” of the concepts or data that they work with.
3.1 OWL basics and SPARQL
The standardized form of expressing ontologies is the Web Ontology Language
(OWL) [7] which adds semantic data to ontologies expressed using the Resource
Description Framework (RDF). RDF is a standard created by the Worldwide Web
Consortium (W3C) that was developed with the goal to enable and promote encoding,
exchange and reuse of structured metadata [6]. RDF is commonly expressed in the
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) with some added constraints to express the
semantics of the meta data. A sample ontology using OWL/RDF is given below.
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http: //www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl#"
xml:base="http: //www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl"
xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org /2000/01/rdf -schema#"
xmlns:owl="http: //www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl#"
xmlns:xsd="http: //www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#"
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xmlns:rdf="http: //www.w3.org /1999/02/22 -rdf -syntax -ns#">
<Ontology rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies /2014/2/
ASU_User"/>
<DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http: //www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies
/2014/2/ ASU_User#age"/>
<DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http: //www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies
/2014/2/ ASU_User#department"/>
<DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http: //www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies
/2014/2/ ASU_User#level"/>
<DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http: //www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies
/2014/2/ ASU_User#name"/>
<DatatypeProperty rdf:about="http: //www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies
/2014/2/ ASU_User#title"/>
<Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies /2014/2/
ASU_User#Employee">
<equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies
/2014/2/ ASU_User#User"/>
</Class>
<Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies /2014/2/ ASU_User#
Member">
<equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies
/2014/2/ ASU_User#User"/>
</Class>
<Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies /2014/2/ ASU_User#
User"/>
This ontology follows the OWL syntax. Note that this is just one of the multiple
syntaxes that are supported in ontologies. Every ontology defines a namespace for all
the classes, properties and individuals that it defines. This allows multiple ontologies
to use the same name for its own declarations provided the namespaces are different
and promotes re-usability of names. Different prefixes are also declared to allow the
usage of names and values defined in other namespaces. This ontology defines three
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classes viz. Employee, User, Member. These classes are declared as equivalent, which
means that an individual, which is an instance of class Member, is also considered
to be a valid instance of the other two classes and vice versa. A few DataProperties
are also declared and these are the properties to be assigned to the individuals in the
ontology. In the context of ABAC, these properties would be the attribute names
and their corresponding values would represent the values for those attributes for the
user. Similar to equivalent classes, we can also have equivalent properties (not shown
in the example above) that would allow different attribute names to correspond to
the same attribute.
SPARQL (recursive acronym for SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language)
[12] is a query language designed to be used with OWL/RDF ontologies. As per the
W3C specification [12], SPARQL is capable of querying required and optional graph
patterns along with their conjunctions and disjunctions. It also supports extensible
value testing and constraining queries by source RDF graph. The syntax of SPARQL
is similar to the commonly known SQL query language for databases, thereby making
it easy to learn and use. A sample SPARQL query is shown below.
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org /1999/02/22 -rdf -syntax -ns#>
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl#>
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#>
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org /2000/01/ rdf -schema#>
PREFIX asu:<http: //www.semanticweb.org/anprabhu/ontologies /2014/2/ ASU_User#>
SELECT ?x
WHERE { ?x rdf:type asu:Employee .
?x asu:level ?level .
FILTER (STR(? level) = "manager")
}
This simple SPARQL query selects individuals from the ontology which are in-
stances of the Employee class whose level is ”manager”. We define variables using
the ? prefix to the variable name. In this example, the variables are ?x and ?level.
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The rdf:type refers to the class of the individual that is being searched (in this case
the class is Employee from the namespace defined by the asu prefix. The results
are filtered based on the value of the level data property of the Employee individual
and only those individuals that satisfy the filter condition are returned. One of the
advantage of SPARQL is it will automatically consider the equivalence of classes and
properties while executing the query. For example, if we consider the ontology struc-
ture defined earlier, this query will also return any individuals of type Member and
User that have the level property value ”manager”.
A lot of tools are publicly available, many of them open-source which help you to
create and edit ontologies in a very user friendly way. In my implementation, I have
used the Protege Ontology Editor [13]. It is an open source software that can create,
validate and edit ontologies and also provides interface to run SPARQL queries. Many
tutorials like [14] are available that show how to use this software.
In the implementation (described later in the document), I would be using SPARQL
to define the access policies for the shared resources. This choice is made because
it would give the system an easy way of handling the ontology and attribute prop-
erties in a reliable manner. SPARQL, combined with the Pellet Reasoner for OWL
ontologies [15] is a very handy tool for querying and validating ontologies.
3.2 Ontologies in ABAC
Now that we are familiar with ABAC and Ontologies, let us see how they can work
together. Recalling the attribute assignment in ABAC, the Attribute Authority is
responsible for the creation and assignment of attributes to users and other subjects.
The aim of using ontologies is to allow for sharing of data between systems that use
different sets of attributes without having to translate access policies every time. In
the proposed design of this thesis, all the various AAs initially decide their own sets
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of attributes to be used in the system under them. There occurs a negotiation of
these different attribute sets between the AAs and all the equivalent attributes are
defined. All these attributes are then given a proper structure and definition using
an ontology that would specify the equivalence of all the different attributes.
Now that we have an attribute structure (ontology) that is agreed upon by all the
concerned attribute authorities, it is fairly straightforward for an AA to translate and
evaluate an access policy that is defined by a subject from another ABAC system.
The ontology enables an AA to create an equivalent policy for its own system by
replacing the attributes in the access policy (if required) by their equivalent attributes
in its system. If certain attributes are not present in the AAs domain, they can be
ignored as they are not relevant in that particular domain. To illustrate, consider the
attribute set A = {attr1, attr2, attr3, attr4} used by attribute authority Auth. Let A’
= {attr′1, attr′2, attr′3, attr′4} be the attribute set used by attribute authority Auth’. A
user from the domain of Auth shares a file with access policy as attr1∧ (attr2∨attr3)
and wants to share it with users from domain of Auth’. If the ontology defines that
attri ≡ attr′i, then Auth’ can translate the access policy to attr′1∧(attr′2∨attr′3) which
would be a valid access policy for any user in the domain of Auth’.
If we consider the same scenario without a defined ontology, Auth and Auth’ would
need to have a negotiation first to map their attributes to one another for Auth’ to
create its equivalent policy. The attribute sets in this example have four attributes
each, however in a real-world situation there can be potentially a very large number of
attributes in a system depending on its security and access requirements. Mapping of
attributes every time some data needs to be shared will prove to be computationally
intensive and thus not feasible.
In Figure 3.1 we see the overall architecture of the proposed design. Each AA
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Attribute Authority Attribute Authority
Attribute Set Attribute Set
Resource Pool Resource Pool
Attribute 
Ontology
User User User UserUserUser
Figure 3.1: Overall Architecture
represents an independent ABAC system and has its own attribute set to be used
within that system. Multiple users are present in all the ABAC systems and there
is a pool of resources that are shared securely by the users within it. Some of these
resources may be shared with other systems (represented by the intersection of the
resource pools). There is a common attribute ontology that is set up initially and
it defines the mapping between the attributes of the multiple ABAC systems. All
the AAs involved can access the ontology and translate the access policies defined by
another system to accommodate its own users in the shared pool of resources.
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Advantages
• Attribute Authorities need not negotiate every time they needs to share data
with each other.
• The same access policy can be used for sharing in any ABAC system that is a
part of the ontology.
• New AAs can join the ontology by adding their own attributes into the already
mapped sets of the ontology. This way, all the AAs need not negotiate each
time a new AA is added to the ontology.
• It allows for selective use of attributes in a shared environment. For example,
if a particular AA wants to restrict which users are to be allowed to share
resources in the common pool, it can add only those attributes in the ontology.
• If ABE is used to encrypt the data (described in the next chapter), having an
ontology means that the data need not be encrypted or decrypted again to allow
for different attribute names. This is a big saving where computation time and
resources are concerned.
• In an Information Centric Network (ICN) environment, this allows for a single
copy of the data to be present in the network cache, thereby saving a lot on the
limited memory space.
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Chapter 4
CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE BASED ENCRYPTION
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) was introduced by J. Bethen-
court et al [16]. In this scheme, each user is assigned a set of attributes that represent
the roles and access permissions of that user in the system. Each user is assigned a
private key that has the attributes issued to the user and this can be used to decrypt
the encrypted data that the user tries to access.
In a sense CP-ABE is similar to the Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) scheme described
in [17], however it has significant differences as far as the construction is concerned.
In KP-ABE, ciphertexts are associated with a set of descriptive attributes, and user’s
keys are associated with policies. This is exactly the reverse of the situation in CP-
ABE. As argued in [16], in KP-ABE, the encryptor exerts no control over who has
access to the data being encrypted, except by the choice of the descriptive attributes
for the data. The encryptor must trust that the key-issuer issues the appropriate keys
to grant or deny access to the appropriate users. In contrast, CP-ABE attaches the
policy to the ciphertext and the descriptive attributes to the private keys. This gives
the encryptor the power and flexibility to explicitly specify the access policy to the
encrypted data being shared. For example, ABE can be used to encrypt a file using
the policy
Professor and (CS Dept or EE Dept)
If a user obtains a private key with an assignment of attributes that satisfies
either of the two allowed combinations as per the above policy, he/she can decrypt
the file based on the match between access policies embedded into the file and identity
attributes described in the user’s private key.
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The motivation behind using ABE in an ABAC system is that it lends itself
easily to the ABAC concept since both are based on sets of descriptive attributes and
resource access based on policies and attribute assignment based on these attribute
sets. In addition to specifying an access policy from the ABAC perspective, the user
can use that policy specification to encrypt the data considering that the attribute
sets in ABAC and ABE is the same. This adds an additional layer of security to
ABAC. In case a user’s credentials are compromised, the attacker may be still able to
download the file/resource. However with the use of ABE, the resource will be in the
encrypted form and the attacker will not be able to decrypt it unless he has access
to the private key of the user whose credentials have been compromised.
The CP-ABE algorithms are described in Appendix A. This chapter will focus
more on how CP-ABE can be used in the ABAC environment that we have set
up so far. For the sake of simplicity, wherever mentioned, encryption/decryption is
synonymous with CP-ABE encryption/decryption in the rest of the document unless
explicitly mentioned otherwise.
As mentioned earlier, the user’s private keys (or decryption keys) are associated
with a set of descriptive attributes. In our ABAC environment, these attributes will
be specified by the Attribute Authority. For string attributes, CP-ABE uses string
literals as attributes for encryption and decryption. If we use CP-ABE in its pure
form, then it will not be possible to allow for attribute equivalence. For example, if
a subject in the ABAC system has attribute User, and an encrypted document had
used Member as the encryption policy. As per our ontology based design described
in the previous chapter, the user would be allowed access to the document (provided
User and Member have been declared as equivalent attributes in the ontology). Since
CP-ABE does not currently support such an equivalence of attributes, we modify our
design slightly to allow for CP-ABE to be used along with attribute equivalence.
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As seen in the previous chapter, we can define equivalent attributes in the OWL
ontology. We now go a step further and map all equivalent attributes to a single
attribute-id. All equivalent attributes have the same attribute-id. While creating the
policy for cryptographic purposes, we use this attribute-id to encrypt the data instead
of using one of the attributes from the equivalent set. The advantage of using this
approach is that the encryption policy does not change for different ABAC systems as
all the equivalent attributes will be mapping to the common attribute-id. Even when
the decryption keys are issued to the subjects, the attribute-ids are used to specify
the subject’s attributes in the private key.
To implement this, we add an Object Property named ”hasUniqueName” to the
ontology. A new class is created for every unique name required and the corresponding
equivalent classes are mapped to the unique name class using the hasUniqueName
property. In my implementation, I am using the ”hasUniqueName some UniqueClass”
cardinality and it can vary across implementations. This just means that the target
of the hasUniqueName object property would be the UniqueClass class. All the
equivalent attributes are mapped to the same unique class via this property. An
example where a class is mapped using the hasUniqueName property is shown below.
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&OntologyABAC_Demo;hasUniqueName"/>
<owl:Class rdf:about="&OntologyABAC_Demo;Junior">
<rdfs:subClassOf >
<owl:Restriction >
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="&OntologyABAC_Demo;hasUniqueName"/>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&OntologyABAC_Demo;UniqueJunior"/>
</owl:Restriction >
</rdfs:subClassOf >
</owl:Class >
In this case, the class Junior is mapped to class UniqueJunior via the hasUnique-
Name object property. Any other class in the ontology that is declared to be equiv-
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alent to Junior will also need to be mapped to the UniqueJunior class in a similar
fashion. With this defined, whenever we want the unique attribute/class name to
use in the ABE encryption policy, we can query the ontology for the range of the
”hasUniqueName” object property. The SPARQL query for achieving the purpose
for this example is given below.
PREFIX rdf:<http: //www.w3.org /1999/02/22 -rdf -syntax -ns#>
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl#>
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#>
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org /2000/01/ rdf -schema#>
PREFIX asu: <http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/ OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#>
SELECT ?x
WHERE
{
asu:className rdfs:subClassOf ?object .
?object a owl:Restriction .
?object owl:onProperty asu:hasUniqueName .
?object owl:someValuesFrom ?x
}
This query again assumes that the ”some” cardinality has been used in specifying
the hasUniqueName object property. It can change depending upon the implemen-
tation. Basically this query takes a ”className”, which is the domain class that the
user is looking to find the unique name for, and then detects the target of the object
property for that class. This target is then stored in the variable x and that is dis-
played/returned. In the implementation, if a class does not have the object property
defined, we can assume that it does not have other equivalent classes and therefore
the class name itself can be used as an attribute for encryption purposes.
In this manner, whenever we need the unique name for any attribute, we simply
need to query for the range of the object property giving the domain as the attribute
for which the unique name is being searched. This approach ensures that all the data
is being encrypted by using the unique names as attributes in the encryption policy.
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The same names are used to specify attributes in the decryption keys of the users.
This ensures that the encryption and decryption is coherent and any valid user can
decrypt the data that is encrypted by a user of another ABAC system.
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Chapter 5
IMPLEMENTATION AND DEMONSTRATION
In this section I will describe my implementation of the proposed design. Figure
5.1 describes the workflow of the implemented system.
The establishment of the ontology is assumed to be done when the system is
set up initially. All the n ABAC systems share their own individual attribute sets
and negotiate in order to come up with an agreed-upon ontology. This ontology is
then used by the users to create their access policies and share the data. Below is a
summary of the tools I have used in the implementation.
Table 5.1: Summary of Software Tools Used
Tool Name Purpose
J2EE Server Side Development
Apache Tomcat 6 Web Server
HTML, CSS User Interface
Protege 4.3 View and Create Ontology
Apache Jena Ontology library
Pellet Reasoner SPARQL query execution
The software has been implemented as a web application that allows users to share
files among themselves. The admin can upload an ontology to the server which all
the users can access. A user can upload files to the server, however these files cannot
be downloaded until the owner of the file decides to share it. When the owner shares
a particular file, he has to upload a corresponding access policy. The server checks
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N ABAC Systems decide 
to share data
Negotiate Attribute sets 
and establish ontology
User wants to upload 
files to shared pool
User determines access 
policy for file based on 
the allowed attributes in 
ontology
Uploads policy and 
shared file
Server verifies if policy 
is as per the ontology
File added into resource 
pool if policy is valid
Encrypt?
User(s) attempt to 
download file
Server checks if user 
satisfies file’s access 
policy
User is given file if 
user’s attributes satisfy 
access policy
Decrypt?
Figure 5.1: Workflow
if the access policy (in this case a SPARQL query) is as per the defined ontology
and saves it as the access policy for that particular file if it is valid. Once a file is
shared, other users have the option of attempting to download the file. When a user
tries to download a shared file, the server retrieves the corresponding access policy
and executes the query to retrieve the list of users that satisfy the access policy. If
the user who is attempting to download the file is a part of this list, then the file is
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allowed to be downloaded.
5.1 Demo Scenario
The scenario chosen for the testing is as follows.
A = {Medical_Director, HOD, 
Attending_Physician, Fellow, 
Chief_ Resident, Senior_Resident, 
Junior_Resident}
Users
A = { Dean, Assistant_Dean, HOD, 
Professor, Assistant_Professor, 
Lecturer, Senior_Resident, 
Junior_Resident, Intern, 
Medical_Student}
Users
Resource pool for sharing data
Attribute Ontology
Hospital A
Hospital cum Medical 
Institute B
Figure 5.2: Demonstration
Consider a medical healthcare environment. There are two organisations, a Hos-
pital A that is currently treating a patient, and a Hospital cum Medical Institute B
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that is a medical college in addition to being a hospital. The attribute sets of the two
organisations are depicted in Figure 5.2. As is apparent from the figure, both the or-
ganisations have a different manner of categorizing their users and have different sets
of literals for describing the possible attributes for a user in their own environment.
For example, B has additional attributes that describe the level of the personnel
involved in teaching in the institute (Professor, Assistant Professor, etc). These
personnel are also considered Doctors in the system.
Now consider the scenario where a patient who is currently being treated in Hos-
pital A wants to shift the treatment to B for location or personal preference. The
medical records of the said patient need to be transferred from A to B. This may seem
trivial at first, but legal requirements like HIPAA [18] entail that the data should not
be available for public access.The law stipulates that a consent be obtained from the
patient as to who should be allowed access to the medical records. Usually the at-
tending doctor or team of doctors are allowed access to the medical records. Medical
transcription companies are also allowed access to the data, but not in its entirety.
Some places may have additional laws that require further consent to share sensitive
data. For example in New York, an additional authorization is needed that explicitly
states that the patient wants the facility to release records containing information
on HIV diagnosis or treatment. With all these considerations in mind, we need a
mechanism to specify access policies for the sensitive data and also keep it flexible.
Given below is the ontology that is established for the scenario depicted in Figure
5.2.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [
<!ENTITY owl "http://www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl#" >
<!ENTITY xsd "http: //www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#" >
<!ENTITY rdfs "http://www.w3.org /2000/01/rdf -schema#" >
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<!ENTITY rdf "http: //www.w3.org /1999/02/22 -rdf -syntax -ns#" >
<!ENTITY OntologyABAC_Demo "http: //www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#" >
]>
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Assistant_Dean">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Assistant_Professor">
<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies
/2014/2/ OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Fellow"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Attending_Physician">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Chief_Resident">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Resident"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Dean">
<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies
/2014/2/ OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Medical_Director"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
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<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Fellow">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Head_of_Department">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Intern">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Student"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Junior_Resident">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Resident"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Lecturer">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Medical_Director">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
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<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Medical_Student">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Student"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Professor">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Doctor"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Resident"/>
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Senior_Resident">
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Resident"/>
</owl:Class >
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/
OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#Student"/>
The attributes have also been classified in order to have more generic specification
of access policy. For example, if some data is to be shared with all Doctors, only the
attribute Doctor can be specified, and all the sub-classes of Doctor in the ontology
will automatically satisfy the access policy. A more simpler view of the ontology
structure in the Protege Ontology Editor [13] shown in Figure 5.3.
Considering that the patient records are accessible to a Fellow and the Chief Resident
in Hospital A. The patients wants the same authorization to be carried forward to the
Institute B. For brevity, I am not considering the specialisation of the doctor and the
specific department to which he/she belongs to. A sample access policy in Hospital
A is expressed in SPARQL for the ontology described above.
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Figure 5.3: Ontology Structure
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org /1999/02/22 -rdf -syntax -ns#>
PREFIX owl: <http://www.w3.org /2002/07/ owl#>
PREFIX xsd: <http://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#>
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org /2000/01/ rdf -schema#>
PREFIX ont: <http://www.semanticweb.org/ontologies /2014/2/ OntologyABAC_Demo.owl#>
SELECT ?x
WHERE {
{ ?x rdf:type ont:Fellow }
UNION
{?x rdf:type ont:Chief_Resident }
}
Now we use the same access policy without changing it for authorization in In-
stitute B. The ontology reasoner detects that attribute Fellow is equivalent to the
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attribute Assistant Professor from the attribute set of Institute B. Therefore any
user from Institute B who has the attribute Assistant Professor would be able to
access the data.
This would work fine with the ABAC system. Now for additional security let us
add CPABE encryption to the system. In Figure 5.3, we see a set of classes that
represent the unique names of the attributes. All classes that are equivalent to each
other are mapped to the same unique name class using the hasUniqueName object
property. The attribute names in the ABAC policy mentioned above are now replaced
with their unique names for the ABE encryption policy. Therefore, the equivalent
encryption policy for the above ABAC policy would be
UniqueAssistantProf or UniqueChiefResident
This encryption policy would be valid for both the environments since the unique
names are used by the attribute authorities to associate the private keys with at-
tributes. Therefore, as long as the attributes of all the member organizations are
mapped correctly to their unique names, we can use ABE techniques for providing
additional security in this distributed environment.
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Chapter 6
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we will evaluate the performance of the ontology-based approach as
against not using ontologies in ABAC.
Using the same application scenario described earlier, we will evaluate how using
ontologies is more effective. The two medical institutions have their own sets of
attributes and they need to share the sensitive data with each other.
6.1 Without Using Ontologies
Hospital A wants to transfer the medical record of a patient to Hospital B. The
data has an access policy P1 over the set of attributes A1 . If this data is to be
shared, then the access policy P1 has to be translated into an equivalent policy P2
over the set of attributes A2. So now the Attribute Authority of Hospital A needs
to ask for the attribute set A2 from the Attribute Authority of Hospital B. Once
the set is received, it would need to create a mapping between A1 and A2 so that
the attributes of A can be mapped to their corresponding attributes in A2. Once
the mapping is created, P1 is translated into P2 by replacing the attributes in P1
with their corresponding attributes from A2. Therefore there are three operations
that need to be performed before any data can be shared between the two hospitals
namely Fetch, Map, Translate. Considering that the time taken for Fetch operation
is TF , time for Map operation is TM and time for Translate operation is TT , then the
total time taken for the entire process would be
Ttotal = TF + TM + TT
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In addition to this, if we consider the use of Attribute Based Encryption to encrypt
the data, then the encrypted data would need to be decrypted first and then re-
encrypted using the attributes from A2 to specify the encryption policy then the
equation becomes
Ttotal = TF + TM + TT + 2TE + TD
where TE and TD are the times taken for encryption and decryption respectively.
Note that the initial encryption operation is also accounted for since it is a part of
sharing the data.
6.2 Using Ontologies for Attribute Management
Initially all the hospitals that would be sharing any form of data would establish a
common ontology which would also define the equivalence of the different attributes
belonging to the various systems. This process executes only once initially. If a new
hospital or medical institution wants to join the share resource pool, then it would add
its own attributes in the mapping already created. So now when Hospital A wants
to transfer the medical record of a patient to Hospital B, there is no need to perform
the Fetch, Map or Translate operations since the ontology already has the mapping
created and the attribute equivalence defined in the ontology removes the need for
translation of access policies. The encryption using the ontology based approach
would use the unique names of the attributes to specify the encryption policies. Since
equivalent attributes map to the same unique name, it would remove the need to
decrypt and re-encrypt the data again. Therefore only the initial encryption would
need to be considered and the total time taken thus becomes
Ttotal = TE
The data for the time taken to encrypt and decrypt for different number of at-
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tributes was collected and based on that we see the graph below. Note that this graph
does not consider the TF ,TM and TT values.
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Figure 6.1: Time Consumption for Records Transfer
Comparing the Ttotal values of both the approaches, it is evident that the gain
in terms of computation time is significant. This becomes more valuable in a large
scale environment when the computing resources are already overloaded and even a
minor improvement leads to great performance benefits. Since ABE operations are
known to be computationally intensive, the reduction in the number of encryption
and decryption operations saves a significant amount of computation power.
In terms of the storage overhead, if we do not use ontologies, then multiple copies
of the encrypted data would need to be stored in the resource pool, one for each of
39
the hospital that is one of the intended recipients of the shared data. The encryption
policy of these would depend on the target institution and would use the target
institution’s set of attributes to specify the access policy. When we use ontologies,
only a single copy can be stored in the pool since the policy will not change for
each of the target institutions. This is beneficial especially when a large number of
institutions are a part of the pool and many different types of data is being shared.
The reduction in the number of copies allows more data to be shared in the pool
without having to swap out existing ones.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis we analysed the ABAC model of access control and a new approach
to attribute management in ABAC has been proposed. The concept of ontologies is
introduced to provide a flexible and scalable mechanism to manage attributes in a
distributed manner. With the proposed design, multiple ABAC systems can share
data and resources among themselves without needing specific knowledge about the
other systems’ attribute sets and without compromising the access control enforce-
ment. The design was made even more secure by using CP-ABE to encrypt the data
using the access policies specified by the data owners and the ontology design was
modified to easily accommodate CP-ABE without needing to encrypt the data again.
The validity of the design has been confirmed by creating a demo scenario around
it and verifying all the claims made earlier. A web-based implementation was cre-
ated to test the demo scenario and the claims about the scalability, flexibility and
reliability of the system were verified. The major contribution of this research has
been a mechanism that makes ABAC much more scalable, thereby making it easy to
use in a large scale distributed computing environment (for example a Cloud). The
distributed structure of the design allows each system to manage its own attributes
independently without affecting the overall data sharing setup.
There is a lot of scope for future work in this area. Some of the areas where future
research can focus are
• Modify existing ABE algorithms to allow attribute equivalence so that different
user’s belonging to different attribute sets can share encrypted data without
having to decrypt and encrypt again.
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• The efficiency of the system is highly dependent on the structure of the gen-
erated ontology. Therefore an optimal structure of the attribute ontology is
needed for the system to work efficiently. A methodology is needed that would
determine the optimality of the ontology structure, and if possible develop a
mechanism that would generate an optimal structure for the ontology that is
being negotiated between the ABAC systems.
• Develop mechanism to allow distributed ontologies. Instead of having a single
ontology for the whole setup, a mechanism can be developed for allowing the
use of multiple ontologies for the attribute structure.
• In the current design, the ontology is assumed to have been setup offline or by
an initial negotiation between the different Attribute Authorities. An algorithm
for dynamic setup of ontology can be developed where a attribute ranking mech-
anism can be developed to detect attribute equivalence and create an ontology
given n attribute sets.
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APPENDIX A
CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ATTRIBUTE BASED ENCRYPTION
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The foundation of ABE is bilinear pairing computation. Assume two groups: an
additive group G0 and a multiplicative group G1 with a same large prime order p.
Discrete Logarithm Problem is difficult in both of them. We define a bilinear map
e : G0 ×G0 → G1. This map has three properties:
• Bilinearity: e(P a, Qb) = e(P,Q)ab, for any P,Q ∈ G0 and a, b ∈ Zp;
• Nondegeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1, where g is the generator of G0;
• Efficiency: Computing the pairing can be efficiently achieved.
In CP-ABE, there are three types of keys: master key, public key and private
key. A TTP is required to generate a set of public parameters and securely store the
master key. The TTP will not be involved in the network communication. It can be
offline all the time. The scheme of CP-ABE consists of four basic algorithms:
• Setup
The TTP chooses two random exponents α, β ∈ Zp. A public key is formatted as
PK =< G0, g, h, f, e(g, g)
α >
The master key is
MK = (β, gα).
Here h = gβ, f = g
1
β . The public key is published by the TTP before deploy-
ment.
• KeyGen
This algorithm is used to generate private keys based on its inputs: the master
key (MK) and a set of attributes S. The TTP runs the KeyGen algorithm
once to generate a private key according to attributes assigned to that node.
This private key is then used by the user to decrypt the ciphertext using the
Decrypt algorithm. To generate the private key, the algorithm first chooses a
random number r ∈ Zp, and then a random number rj ∈ Zp for each attribute
j ∈ S. The secret key is then computed as
SK = (D = g(α+r)/β,∀j ∈ S : Dj = gr.H(j)rj , D′j = grj)
• Encrypt
The inputs of this algorithm are the public key, the message M and a policy tree
T over the set of allowed attributes. The algorithm encrypts M and outputs
ciphertext CT such that only those users whose private keys have attributes
that satisfy the policy represented by T will be able to decrypt it.
1. The degree of the secret polynomial px is set to be dx = kx − 1
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2. For root node r, choose a random value s in Zp. Set pr(0) = s. An
element dr in Zp is chosen randomly to completely define pr. For any
other non-leaf node x, set its secret to be one secret share of its parent
node, i.e. px(0) = pparent(x)(index(x)), and randomly choose element dx to
completely define px.
3. Define a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G which is modelled as a random
oracle. For each leaf node x, assign the value
Ex = g
px(0), E ′x = H(att(x))
px(0)
The ciphertext is then constructed using the access structure T
CT = (T, C˜ = Me(g, g)αs, C = hs,∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy(0), C ′y =
H(att(y))qy(0))
• Decrypt
This algorithm takes the ciphertext (which contains the access policy), the
public parameters and a private key as inputs. If the attributes in the private
key satisfy the access policy of the ciphertext, the algorithm will decrypt the
ciphertext and output the original message.
A recursive algorithm DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) is defined that takes as input
the ciphertext CT = (T, C˜, C,∀y ∈ Y : Cy, C ′y), a secret key SK which is
associated with a set S of attributes, and a node x from T . If the node is a leaf
node, then we take i = att(x). If i ∈ S, then
DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) =
e(Di, Cx)
e(D′i, C ′x)
=
e(gr.H(i)ri , hqx(0)
e(gri , H(i)qx(0)
= e(g, g)rqx(0)
(A.1)
If i /∈ S, then DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) =⊥.
When x is a non-leaf node, for all the nodes z that are children of x, it calls
DecryptNode(CT, SK, z) and stores the output as Fz. Let Sx be an arbitrary
kx-sized set of child nodes z such that Fz 6=⊥. If no such set exists, then the
function returns ⊥. Otherwise we compute
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Fx =
∏
z∈Sx
F
∆i,S′x (0)
z , i = index(z), S
′
x = index(z) : z ∈ Sx
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g, g)r.qz(0))∆i,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Sx
(e(g, g)r.qparent(z)(index(z)))∆i,S′x (0)
=
∏
z∈Sx
e(g, g)r.qx(i).∆i,S′x (0)
= e(g, g)r.qx(0)
(A.2)
The Decrypt algorithm begins by calling the DecryptNode function on the root
nodeR of the tree T . If the tree is satisfied by S we setA = DecryptNode(CT, SK, r) =
e(g, g)rqR(0) = e(g, g)rs. It now decrypts by computing
C˜/(e(C,D)/A) = C˜/(e(hs, g(α+r)/β)/e(g, g)rs) = M
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